Abstract
Introduction: Use of Force and the Court
When in 1943-1944, the Informal Inter-Allied Committee (the 'London Committee') debated the future of international adjudication, it sought to avoid a politicization of the soon-to-be established International Court of Justice (ICJ). One of its main concerns was that ' [a]ll possibility should be excluded of its being used to deal with cases which are really political in their nature, and which require to be dealt with by means of political decision and not by reference to a court of law.' 1 In the 60 years following publication of the Committee's report, this concern has been widely echoed, especially in relation to what is commonly considered to be the most politicized of all issues, namely questions involving the use of force in inter-state relations. To give but a handful of examples, litigating states or commentators have argued that questions involving the use of inter-state force are generally outside the Court's jurisdiction; 2 that the Court is not in a position to handle ongoing conflicts and should therefore not exercise jurisdiction over them (even if it was otherwise established); 3 or that armed conflicts fall within the exclusive competence of political bodies. 4 More cautiously, others have argued that the Court's main contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes lies in other, technical (allegedly 'non-political') fields of international law, whereas political issues cannot be dealt with appropriately by the ICJ. 5 This is not the place to discuss in any detail the validity of these assertions, nor to engage with the underlying premise that some classes of disputes are inherently more political than others. Instead, it is worth pointing out that neither traditionally, nor in its more recent jurisprudence, has the Court shied away from pronouncing on disputes involving the legal rules governing the use of force by states. 6 As a consequence, much of the modern law regulating the use of force by states is a product of the Court's interpretation and application of the United Nations Charter and the rules of customary international law. Furthermore, as Christine Gray has observed in a recent article, there has also been 'no general, principled reluctance by states to submit cases on such controversial subject matter [i.e. cases involving questions concerning See, e.g., Nicaragua case, supra note 3, at 431-436, paras 89-98, and 438-441, paras 102-108 (second, third, and fifth preliminary objections of the United States); see also the Land and Maritime Boundary case, supra note 3, at 304-309, paras 61-73 (Nigeria's third preliminary objection). For a detailed assessment see the articles by Gray and Schachter, both supra note 3. The Cameroon(Nigeria case [2002] ICJ Rep 303, may be seen as an exception; in it, the Court did not address the parties' claims based on alleged violations of Art. 2(4) UN Charter: see Gray, supra note 3, at 882-884. the use of force] to the Court'.
7 From the very beginning of its existence, but increasingly since the 1990s, States have submitted to the ICJ cases bearing, directly or indirectly, on that matter. In the first contentious case of its history, Corfu Channel, the Court used the opportunity to underline the absolute scope of the prohibition against the use of force. Contrary to the United Kingdom's assertion in that case, 8 it clarified that that prohibition not only covered large-scale operations threatening another state's territorial integrity or political independence, but all other uses of force, since these were 'contrary to the objects of the United Nations' in the sense of Article 2(4) UN Charter.
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In 1986, the use of force again played a central role in one of the Court's most controversial judgments, namely the Nicaragua case. In its judgment of 27 June 1986, the Court elaborated on the matter at some length, inter alia clarifying the scope of the customary prohibition on the use of force, confirming a restrictive understanding of the notion of 'armed attack' 10 (triggering a right of self-defence), and opting for an equally narrow approach to the question of 'private force' 11 -a matter which will receive further attention below. More recently, in its Oil Platforms judgment of 6 November 2003, 12 the Court went out of its way to 'state its view on the legal limits on the use of force at a moment when these limits find themselves under the greatest stress'. 13 As far as the substance of this re-statement of the law in times of crisis is concerned, the Court notably affirmed one crucial aspect of the Nicaragua case by distinguishing between armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 and lesser forms of force not triggering a right of self-defence. opportunity to pronounce on a much-discussed aspect of the legal regime governing the use of force by states. Having found the construction of that wall to be in violation of international law, 16 it assessed whether Israel's conduct could be justified with reference to the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Given the influence of its previous statements on the use of force, the Court's answer to this question deserves an in-depth analysis. This article seeks to provide that analysis. The Court's treatment of the matter is outlined in Section 2. The article then analyses the main features of its reasoning in Section 3, evaluates alternatives to the Court's approach in Section 4 and, finally, assesses its implications in Section 5.
The Court's Treatment of the Self-defence Issue
Before assessing the persuasiveness of the Court's reasoning, it is necessary to give a proper account of its analysis of the use of force issue in the Wall case. This can be done rather briefly, because -unlike in the earlier cases referred to above -the Court treated the matter rather lightly in this case. This may be explained by reference to the lack of argument, in the written and oral hearings, on the use of force.
17 Still, the Court seemed compelled to respond to Israel's claim, made before the UN General Assembly and reproduced in the UN Secretary-General's dossier, that 'the fence is a measure wholly consistent with the right of States to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter', as interpreted in recent resolutions of the UN Security Council.
18
The Court's response to this claim can be found in one single paragraph of its Advisory Opinion (para. 139), which provides:
139. Under the terms of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.
In addition to Article 51, the Court assessed whether the construction of the wall could be justified by considerations of necessity. 19 In this respect, the question was left 20 were not met, as 'the construction of the wall along the route chosen' was not 'the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that construction'. 21 Given that the present comment is intended to focus on use of force issues, to which necessity probably does not apply at all, or at least only in exceptional instances, 22 this aspect of the Court's reasoning will be left aside here. It deserves to be noted, however, that the Court, in its discussion of necessity, refrained from making general observations about the state of the law. Instead, rather pragmatically, the Court dismissed necessity on the facts, while cautiously avoiding any general position on the availability of necessity.
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The Court's treatment of self-defence stands in marked contrast; it is characterized by very firm views on the state of the law. This begins with the Court's rather bold observation that Article 51 'has no relevance in th[e] case', 24 which goes beyond usual concluding sentences, such as 'as a consequence, self-defence does not justify the construction of a wall' or 'the Court concludes that the requirements of Article 51 are not met'. In addition, three features stand out:
(1) As regards the substance of its decision, the Court's reasoning seems to be based on two inter-related arguments. First, from the text of Article 51, the Court deduced that self-defence could only be exercised against an 'armed attack by one State against another State'. 25 For the sake of simplicity, this may be called the 'State attack argument'. In the circumstances of the case, this reading of Article 51 meant that Israel could not claim to be acting in self-defence because, irrespective of all other problems, terrorist attacks originating within the Palestinian territory did not qualify as 'armed attacks by another State'. sufficiently 'external' to trigger a right of self-defence in the sense of Article 51. Instead, they emanated from an area over which 'Israel exercises control ' . 26 This in turn served as a basis for distinguishing the Wall case from the situation underlying Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) , in which the Security Council had had to deal with terrorist attacks emanating 'from outside', i.e. from an area not controlled by the victim state. (3) Lastly, it is interesting that, unlike in other decisions involving use of force issues, the Court did not seem to consider the matter to be of crucial relevance: its reasoning on the law of self-defence is thus contained in one single paragraph comprising no more than 12 lines (three of which reproduce the text of Article 51). The brevity of the Court's pronouncement presents a third aspect that merits discussion.
Critical Comment
In assessing the Court's treatment of the self-defence issue, it seems helpful to focus on the main features identified in the previous section.
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A 'External Attacks'
The first of the two substantive arguments referred to by the Court, the 'external origin argument', raises important questions about the availability of self-defence in situations not involving inter-state force; or -as the Court put it -situations involving attacks originating within territory over which the state relying on self-defence 'exercises control'. 28 Underlying this argument there would appear to be the Court's concern to clarify that Article 51 could not be invoked against 'internal attacks' or 'attacks from within'. As Judge Kooijmans observed in very clear terms, the right of self-defence 'is a rule of international law and thus relates to international phenomena'. 29 At some basic level, this concern is of course entirely reasonable: for example, it goes without saying that Article 51 cannot justify responses against armed attacks, whatever their gravity, committed within a state, by that state's own nationals. The real question, however, is not one of principle, but one of application: Under what circumstances can an armed attack be considered sufficiently internationalized to trigger a right of self-defence in the sense of Article 51? Alternatively, in Judge Kooijmans terms, when does an armed attack become an 'international phenomenon '? 30 In this respect, it may seem rather surprising that, in view of the majority, attacks originating within the Palestinian territories should not be sufficiently international to meet the required threshold. Formally, they clearly emanated from outside Israel, 26 Ibid.
For a fuller treatment of the issues raised in Sections 3A and 3B see Bruha i.e. from foreign territory, which introduced an international element. Moreover, throughout the Wall proceedings, the Court stressed the international character of the Israeli-Palestinian relations by, for example, stressing the right of the Palestine people to self-determination and Palestine's right to participate in the case 31 or the applicability of international humanitarian law to the occupied territories.
32 Judge Higgins thus seems justified in accusing the majority of 'formalism of an unevenhanded sort': 33 In her view (shared by Judge Buergenthal 34 ), 'Palestine cannot be sufficiently an international entity to be invited to these proceedings, and to benefit from humanitarian law, but not sufficiently an international entity for the prohibition of armed attack on others to be applicable.' 35 In the light of these considerations, it seems indeed rather difficult to suggest that attacks originating within the West Bank or the Gaza strip are not 'international phenomena'. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the majority was right in declaring Article 51 inapplicable. The main argument that would seem to support this conclusion, however, has little to do with the internal or international character of the attacks, but concerns the status of the Palestinian territory. In another section of the Opinion, the Court had explained at length that these territories are 'occupied territories', governed by the law of belligerent occupation. 36 As Palestine observed in its written pleadings, 37 this factor in itself would seem to preclude the application of Article 51. Although occupied territory is evidently 'foreign', the means of defence available to occupying powers seem to be governed exclusively by the law of belligerent occupation. A host of provisions, found in the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as the Hague Regulations, recognize the right (and indeed the duty) of occupants to maintain public order within an occupied territory. 38 This, however, has important consequences on the availability of means of defence (such as Art. 51) deriving from the jus ad bellum. At least during an on-going occupation, it would be an 'impermissible confusion' (as the counsel for Palestine observed during the oral As the Court observed in para. 89 of the Opinion, the Hague Regulations (to which Israel was not a party) had acquired customary status.
pleadings)
39 to recognize the existence of a general right of self-defence in the sense of Article 51 alongside public order provisions of the jus in bello. As the more specific regulation tailored to the situation of belligerent occupation, these derogate from the general rules governing resort to force against armed attacks.
Unfortunately, the majority, having affirmed Israel's status as an occupying power, did not assess the consequences flowing from that status on the law of selfdefence. 40 Had it done so, it would have had to analyse whether the construction of the wall could have been justified under any of the public order provisions referred to above -an assessment which might have brought about helpful clarifications regarding the scope and limits of occupants' rights during long-term occupation.
As far as the law of self-defence is concerned, the preceding considerations suggest that occupying powers cannot rely on self-defence in order to justify public order measures aimed at suppressing attacks originating within the occupied territories. In short, it is submitted that Article 51 was inapplicable not because the Israeli-Palestinian relations did not qualify as 'international phenomena', but because the law of belligerent occupation derogated from it. The majority therefore rightly concluded that Article 51 could not justify Israel's conduct within the Palestinian occupied territories. Its brief treatment of the 'external origin argument', however, touches upon, rather than explores, the underlying conceptual issue.
B 'State Attacks'
The Court's second argument (the 'state attack argument') is considerably more problematic. It would appear evident that any pronouncement by the United Nations' 'principal judicial organ' 41 on the possibility of the use of self-defence against attacks by non-state actors would be extremely topical. Although the underlying question (whether armed attacks by non-state actors can trigger a right of self-defence) had been the subject of intense discussion for a long time, 42 it has gained prominence in the course of debates on anti-terrorist measures since the late 1990s. In order to appreciate the Court's pronouncements, these debates need to be briefly recapitulated. Two stages of the development of the law can be distinguished.
The first stage -one might speak of the traditional approach -is characterized by a restrictive understanding of self-defence, epitomized by the Court's 1986 Nicaragua judgment. 43 In that case, the Court had noted that armed attacks by non 44 in addition (as it observed when dismissing the United States' reliance on self-defence) the mere 'provision of weapons or logistical or other support' was not sufficient to amount to an armed attack. 45 The judgment, while controversial at the time, 46 was in line with the general hostility with which the international community responded to assertions, by Israel 47 or South Africa, 48 that cross-border incursions in pursuit of terrorists or insurgents could come within the scope of Article 51. 49 As is well-known, the Nicaragua test has been the subject of much discussion since 1986. In its Tadic judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber famously disavowed it, 50 for which it was heavily criticized by the ILC in its Articles on State Responsibility. 51 Given the prominence of these inter-institutional quarrels, the fact that neither the ILC nor Tadic questioned the traditional, restrictive reading on which Nicaragua was based tends to be overlooked. Differences of detail notwithstanding, it seems to have been broadly agreed that the right of self-defence could only be exercised against armed attacks that were either committed by a state, or imputable to it because of its controlling influence over the actual perpetrators. A glance at the legal literature published since the turn of the century suggests that the traditional, restrictive reading has come under strain. 53 57 Crucially, other states have been far more inclined to accept these claims than was the case two decades earlier, when there was nearunanimous rejection of Israel's or South Africa's very similar assertions. With respect, more specifically, to Israel, many states continued to condemn its 2003 antiterror raids into Syria, but the near-unanimity had begun to fade. 58 Lastly, and most importantly, confronted with the 9/11 bombings, the international community has expressly confirmed that self-defence could be exercised against armed attacks not attributable (under the traditional restrictive test) to another state. 59 Summarizing the international response in very clear terms, Antonio Cassese noted: 'It would thus seem that in a matter of a few days, practically all states (all members of the Security Council plus members of NATO other than those sitting on the Security Council, plus all states that have not objected to resort to Art. 51) have come to assimilate a terrorist attack by a terrorist organization to an armed aggression by a State, entitling the victim state to resort to individual self-defence.' Cf supra note 53, at 996-997. the 9/11 bombings thus signalled a new approach to Article 51, which could not be brought into line with the restrictive Nicaragua approach.
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As this brief account suggests, the current state of the law regarding self-defence against non-state violence is not easy to assess. It may be premature to assert (as many writers have done 62 ) that Article 51 no longer requires any state involvement, and could be invoked against armed attacks irrespective of the attacker's character. This in particular because such a re-reading would not explain why measures of selfdefence directed against non-state perpetrators could incidentally affect the host state's territorial sovereignty. 63 However, the least that can be said is that the traditional understanding of self-defence, set out in Nicaragua, is now no longer 'generally accepted'. 64 International practice since the late 1990s rather points towards a more liberal interpretation, pursuant to which Article 51 covers forcible measures directed against terrorist organizations operating on the territory of another state. Compared to other forms of non-state violence, this would mean a stricter standard of imputability, pursuant to which states harbouring terrorist organizations would be legitimate targets of forcible acts of self-defence -a development that would be in line with the more general evolution of the international rules against terrorism since the late 1990s.
The preceding considerations suggest that Israel's self-defence claim could have raised a host of intricate issues. That the Court decided to ignore them completely, and simply quoted the text of Article 51 (from which it purported to deduce its interpretation) is very curious indeed. This in particular because the wording of Article 51 quite obviously 'is not capable of carrying the load the [Court] seek[s] to place on it': it contains no reference to state involvement in the armed attack, but speaks of an 'armed attack' without any additional qualification. Paradoxically, the open wording of the provision had generally been considered to provide the best support for a broad reading of it. 66 Had the Court wanted to justify the traditional, restrictive reading of Article 51, it would thus have had to move beyond a grammatical interpretation. But more importantly, it ought to have engaged with the more recent practice supporting a broader understanding of Article 51. As it stands, the majority's reliance on the 'state attack argument' remains a mere assertion.
C The 'Telegraphic Nature' 67 of the Court's Statement
One final remark on the length of the Court's treatment of the question may be in order. It can be relatively brief (although not quite as brief as the Court's assessment).
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is indeed difficult to disagree with Sean Murphy, who considered the Court's pronouncement to be 'startling in its brevity'.
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Iain Scobbie, while recognizing the 'telegraphic nature' 69 of paragraph 139, has sought to defend the Court's approach, arguing that the matter was not fully argued by participants and underlining the Court's discretion in responding to requests for advisory Opinions. 70 However, this explanation may be overly benevolent. The very existence of paragraph 139 suggests that the Court felt that Israel's reliance on selfdefence merited some response. Clearly, both in contentious and advisory proceedings, the Court is free to emphasize aspects of its decision by setting out the reasoning upon which they are based in more detail. However, the authority of its pronouncements (especially in non-binding advisory proceedings) depends on the cogency of the Court's reasoning.
In the present instance, it is submitted that the startling brevity of the Court's pronouncement on the law of self-defence weighs negatively on its authority. If, in the view of the majority, Article 51 had 'no relevance' to the case 71 (i.e. was per se inapplicable), this finding on the state of the law governing self-defence should have been justified by legal argument. If, more particularly, the majority, notwithstanding recent practice to the contrary, wished to emphasize the 'state attack argument', one might have expected it to engage with the counter-argument so prominently set out in international documents and the literature, and to explain why they had not led to a broadening of Article 51. More generally, given the sensitivity and importance of ICJ pronouncements on the legal rules governing the use of force, it would have been preferable for the Court to follow the examples of the Nicaragua or Oil Platforms cases, and to address the matter in detail. While there may be virtue in clear and succinct expositions of the law, the Court's treatment of the 'state attack argument' is not balanced and fails to appreciate the complexity of the issue.
Alternatives
The preceding considerations suggest that the Court's reasoning on the question of self-defence is highly problematic. This, however, does not mean that the Court was wrong to reject claims based on self-defence. Quite to the contrary, as far as the result of its analysis is concerned, it is submitted that the Court was entirely correct to 67 Scobbie, supra note 17, at 87. Ibid.
71
Cf Wall case, supra note 15, at para. 139.
conclude that the building of the wall could not be justified on the basis of Article 51. This, in fact, was common ground among an overwhelming majority of judges, notably most of those who expressed concerns about the majority's reasoning, notably Judge Higgins and Judge Kooijmans.
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As noted in the previous section, the Court, in order to justify its holding on Article 51, might have placed greater emphasis on the 'external origin argument', and could have explored the conceptual problem posed by the inter-relation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 73 In addition, it is submitted that the requirement of proportionality would have provided another (and perhaps more elegant) way of dismissing Israel's self-defence claim without entering into detailed considerations (which the Court evidently did not want to engage in). That measures of self-defence, in order to be justified, have to be proportionate (i.e. necessary and commensurate) is generally accepted; equally, it is beyond doubt that proportionality has to be assessed having regard to concrete circumstances in which the allegedly justified measure has been taken. 74 On that basis, it would seem that Israel's claim could have been dismissed rather easily. On the basis of the available evidence, it was by no means obvious that Israel, in order to respond to the alleged 'armed attack', had to build a wall. More importantly, as Judge Higgins pointed out in her Separate Opinion, very little suggested that the wall, in order to be effective, had to follow the specific route chosen by Israel, cutting, at least partly, through the occupied territory. 75 Given the strict limits of the proportionality test, this factor alone might have been sufficient to reject Article 51.
In addition, it deserves to be mentioned that had the Court focused on the question of proportionality, it could have treated claims based on self-defence in precisely the same way in which it had addressed the question of necessity. As noted above, 76 when rejecting that justification the Court had refrained from general assertions about the state of the law but instead focused on the narrower issue of proportionality.
Had it wanted to avoid a fuller treatment of the problems raised by Israel's self-defence claim, the Court should have avoided, it is submitted, the principled language found in paragraph 139 of the Opinion, and instead addressed the question of proportionality. See para. 35 of Judge Higgins' Separate Opinion in Wall case, supra note 15: 'While the wall does seem to have resulted in a diminution on attacks on Israeli civilians, the necessity and proportionality for the particular route selected, with its attendant hardships for Palestinians uninvolved in these attacks, has not been explained.' In addition, Judge Higgins also questioned whether non-forcible measures (such as the construction of a wall) could at all amount to self-defence, or whether that concept covered only forcible measures (ibid.). This, however, seems to be based on an unduly restrictive reading of Art. 51. There is little indication in Art. 51 that measures of self-defence has to involve the use of force; where the defending state seeks to defend itself by measures not involving recourse to force (e.g., blockades), these will a fortiori be justified. Why the Court decided against this approach, which would have accommodated the concerns of Judges Higgins and Kooijmans, is a matter for speculation. What the previous section suggests is that the Court could have dealt with Israel's claims summarily, if it had opted to reject them on the narrower, factual basis.
Implications
The decision of the majority to rely on broader considerations influences the implications of the Wall case on the development of the law of self-defence. This in particular because paragraph 139 of the Opinion, in its general approach to Article 51, is in line with the Court's Oil Platforms judgment of 15 December 2003. 77 Taken together, both decisions strongly reaffirm the traditional, restrictive reading of self-defence as set out in the Court's Nicaragua judgment. Within less than a year, the Court has now confirmed that judgment's two most controversial holdings on the law of self-defence: the Oil Platforms judgment leaves little doubt that, indeed, the prohibition against the use of force can be breached in a 'minor' way, in which case the state victim of that minor breach cannot retaliate by way of self-defence. 78 The more recent pronouncement in the Wall Opinion shows the Court's unwillingness to embrace broader readings of Article 51, which would recognize a right of self-defence against armed attacks by non-state actors not directed and controlled by another state.
From a more general perspective, this has important consequences on the role of Article 51 within the broader spectrum of forcible responses against violence. The restrictive interpretation now confirmed ensures that Article 51 is applicable rather infrequently. States seeking to defend themselves against low-level warfare (the most common form of inter-state force) or private violence not controlled or directed by another state will not be able to rely on self-defence. Borrowing a much-quoted phrase which refers to another famous concept of international law, one might say that selfdefence, read restrictively, becomes 'a vehicle that hardly ever leaves the garage'.
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Whether this is a positive development seems debatable. Of course, at first glance, a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 further reduces the number of instances in which states are entitled to use force unilaterally. Upon analysis, however, it is much more realistic that states, instead of invoking self-defence, will respond to low-level warfare or private violence by relying on other, non-written justifications. While an expansive reading (indicated by recent practice) might have brought these responses within the scope of Article 51 (and subjected them to the procedural and substantive conditions of that provision), 80 the restrictive reading confirmed by the Court increases the pressure to recognize further non-written exceptions to Article 2(4). Judge Simma's separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms case points in this direction: having dismissed Article 51 due to the lack of an 'armed attack', he examined whether the United States conduct could be justified as a forcible countermeasure directed against Iran's previous use of limited force. 82 While this may be the correct interpretation to be drawn from an ambiguous passage in the Nicaragua judgment, 83 it introduces a new exception (and thus new uncertainty) into the legal regime governing the use of force by states.
The pending Armed Activities case between Congo and Uganda 84 (concerning Uganda's military presence in Eastern Congo and its involvement in that country's multiparty civil war 85 ) illustrates a further problem. Given the complex facts of that case, and the involvement of many different factions with changing allegiances, it proved extremely difficult for the Court and litigants to establish the degree of effective state control over private violence which Article 51 (pursuant to the Court's restrictive reading) requires. More generally, the proceedings suggest that self-defence (on which both parties relied), following the restrictive reading confirmed in the Court's recent jurisprudence, will often simply not be applicable to chaotic 'dirty' wars like the one in the Congo. This is not to suggest that a liberal, more flexible approach to the law of self-defence would solve the many problems raised by the Armed Activities case. However, it illustrates that the restrictive reading of Article 51 makes the law of self-defence all the more difficult to apply in practice. Given that under the Charter regime, Article 51 not only preserves an inherent right, but was intended to function as the main exception to the ban on the use of force, this is a curious development.
Concluding Observations
It has been shown in the preceding sections that Israel's reliance on self-defence raised difficult legal problems. If the Court's main concern was to dismiss Article 51 without much discussion, it is submitted that it should have explored the question of proportionality -in line with its treatment of the necessity argument. While the construction of the wall was clearly not proportionate, it was by no means evident (as the Court suggested) that as a matter of law, Article 51 'ha [d] no relevance in this case'. Of the two arguments offered by the Court to dismiss Article 51, one (the external origin argument) would have had to be explored much more fully. More importantly, it has been shown that the Court's second argument (the state attack argument) is very difficult to sustain. The wording of the provision upon which the majority relied does not support the restrictive reading of Article 51. Moreover, this restrictive reading is 82 difficult to reconcile with modern international practice. The majority's failure to engage with this practice seriously affects the persuasiveness of its pronouncement.
While correctly holding that Article 51 did not justify the building of the wall, the Court's treatment of the self-defence issue therefore is one of the most problematic parts of the Opinion as a whole. It is to be hoped that in subsequent judgments the Court will show greater care when addressing highly sensitive use of force issues. The Armed Activities case may provide it with an opportunity to do so soon.
